Chapter 17 of the patent act states:

This means that the government authority by itself or by appointing a third party agency can use the patent for the use of the government with the approval of the patentee paying him a royalty or any form of remuneration agreed between two parties.

Section 47 states that the Government may import, make and use the patented inventions for its own use. The scope of this provision is narrow when compared with government use highlighted in Section 100, wherein it is stated that the government, or any person authorized by it, is empowered to use the patented invention for purposes of government.

In the case Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. AI. Chopra and Konkan Railway Corp. Ltd., the Bombay High Court, brought out the differences between Sections 47 and 100.
In this case, the plaintiff (appellant), Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. (patentee), filed an injunction against the defendant to put an end to the manufacturing and selling of their patented products. The defendant was A. I Chopra, who was making these products and selling them to Konkan Railways under a contract. The defendant contended that since they were manufacturing and selling the patented products only for the Konkan Railways, a Central Government department, and that their contract had been signed on behalf of the President of India, it would fall within the scope of Government use.

The Bombay High Court opined that even third party agencies can use a patented invention on behalf of the Government, but only on the express authorization obtained under Section 100 by the third-party agency from the Government, and payment of an agreed royalty or remuneration to the patentee under Section 100, based on a contract between the two parties. Furthermore, in this case, it was specifically pointed out that a contract between a third party agency and the Central Government, did not effectively serve as express authorization as required by Section 100 to use the patented invention.

It is obvious that on showing by the plaintiff, the breach came to the plaintiff’s knowledge in December 2005. Plaintiff did not take action in the intervening period. Plaintiff has seen defendant No. 1 participating in the contract, and after a lapse of three months of signing the agreement, the plaintiff has filed a suit. It is, therefore, a clear case that there is a delay on the part of the plaintiff in taking steps in preventing the breach of obligation on the part of defendant No. 1 in response to the plaintiff’s right.
The provisions in the tender document fastening a duty on the defendants to secure license and to pay the royalty would, at the most, make the defendant liable monetarily, when breach – infringement is proved.
Plaintiff has not even pleaded that the product, subject-matter, is a product of plaintiff s own research and development and that the technology underlying it was never in use or knowledge of the concern any time in the past.
Moreover, defendant No. l’s plea that the product for which the plaintiff claims to be innovative and hence patent does not look to a layman to be a work of art and innovation appears to be prima facie reasonable.
Considering the case from all angles, this Court finds that the plaintiff has anticipated damages on what is shown in the plaint.
As the result, this Court has concluded that the plaintiff does not have a prima facie strong case entitling the plaintiff to get an injunction against the respondents, holding prima facie that defendant No. 1 is infringing plaintiff right and that the infringement to be such a nature that it cannot be compensated in terms of monetary compensation.